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This article considers the relationship between two processes—conflict resolution
and counterterrorism—which conceptually share many common points, yet in prac-
tice do not necessarily proceed together easily towards a common goal. Considering
particular cases of ethnic conflict in which terrorist factions exist, the article argues
that while neither conflict resolution nor counterterrorism alone can adequately
address the problem, simultaneously conducting both must keep in mind the pro-
cesses’ inherent differences and avoid excessive prioritizing of one over the other.
By exploring recent Turkish governmental initiatives to address the Kurdish ques-
tion, the article attempts to provide an outline for how to successfully cope with
the two processes simultaneously.
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Introduction
Research on conflict resolution and counterterrorism rarely seems to consider the
relationship between the two processes,1 though often—for example, when one party
to the conflict is an ethnic-based terrorist group—the two may be inextricably con-
nected. In such cases, conflict resolution and counterterrorism share a basic bond in
the sense that both seek an end to some kind of conflictual behavior, and indeed,
much of the literature conceptualizing effective counterterrorism attributes success
to factors that are also a part of conflict resolution processes. Particularly in recent
years, counterterrorism studies have stressed the need for more proactive political
responses2 and for rhetorical efforts to delegitimize political violence.3 They have
discussed the need to increase public spending for services in the terrorist group’s
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constituency area,4 and revealed the overall counterproductiveness of harsh, militar-
istic government responses.5
This connection does not mean, however, that conflict resolution and counterter-
rorism will easily proceed side by side towards a common goal. On the contrary, the
two processes may very well clash at fundamental levels, from how they define their
aims and foci, to how they are perceived and acted upon. Traditionally, counterter-
rorism has been conducted as an immediate response to a particular act and is there-
fore executed on a fairly short-term basis, whereas conflict resolution is a broader
process, involving a ‘‘longer-term series of moves to implement [an initial] decision
and to surround it with ties of acceptance.’’6 The latter part of this definition also
raises questions about the participants involved with each process—who is to be
included in the ‘‘ties of acceptance’’? Counterterrorism is usually decided upon at
the bureaucratic level, while conflict resolution, though also demanding bureaucratic-
level decisions and actions, requires a more consensus-based, societally-backed,
national political agenda. Finally, counterterrorism is ultimately focused on terror-
ists, in other words, people with a primarily criminal, ‘‘bad guy’’ image, who need
to be caught or eliminated. Conflict resolution, if it is to succeed, cannot afford to
be as single-minded; it must be comprehensive enough in its approach to accommo-
date everyone and everything, from dissidents’ demands to those of the broader
society, from economic issues to cultural and political ones, and so on.
Underlying the complications that may arise between conflict resolution and
counterterrorism at a more philosophical level are what we might call opposing cen-
tripetal and centrifugal pressures. Conflict resolution demands consensus-building
and a pulling together of all members of two or more groups, whereas counterterror-
ism seems characterized by separation or pulling apart. To begin with, counterterror-
ism is generally focused on the activities of a politically motivated and armed faction
of one of the conflicting groups. While that faction may itself seek some kind of
distancing (for example, separating their broader ethnic group from another ethnic
group), the counterterrorism response also has centrifugal tendencies, as it tries to
physically and psychologically isolate the armed elements from the rest of their
own group, so that they either fade by themselves or can be more easily eliminated.
In other words, while the counterterrorism forces would like to build on and expand
the existing gap between the demands of the armed faction and those of the masses
who may potentially support it,7 the armed faction wants to expand any gap between
‘‘their’’ masses and the other societal group.
Thus, while the processes of counterterrorism and conflict resolution may share
conceptual commonalities for true effectiveness, this does not mean in practice that
either one alone is adequate to deal with contexts of ethnic conflict in which terrorism
is involved. Counterterrorism aimed at wiping out a terrorist faction without address-
ing broader ethnic community issues cannot be expected to fully solve the problem,
perhaps because it is practically impossible to completely isolate an armed ‘‘terrorist’’
faction of a particular ethnic group from its broader potential constituency. Whether
we speak of the Basques in Spain, the Palestinians, or the Kurds in Turkey, even the
most accommodative group members cannot easily sever entirely some feelings of
sympathy or appreciation for the armed faction of their community—particularly
because it is often due to such armed groups’ actions that the broader ethnic
community’s overall cause is brought to the national or global agenda.
On the other hand, the broader ideal of conflict resolution is equally inadequate
for managing ethnic conflicts in which there remains a terrorist threat. Engaging in
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conflict resolution in the hope that it will also resolve terrorism problems is not feas-
ible for the obvious reason that terrorists are armed. They have the power and poten-
tial to keep themselves on the public agenda at all times, and if they do engage in
terrorist activities, public reaction is certain to complicate if not derail a conflict
resolution process. Moreover, a conflict resolution process involving a political,
accommodative approach that acknowledges the needs of different groups may
unwittingly even help an existing terrorist group, in part by providing it the means
to claim that such a ‘‘soft’’ accommodative approach constitutes recognition of their
armed efforts and thus of their own success. Any such boost to the terrorist faction is
likely to have divisive and polarizing results: if the terrorist faction gains strength
and popularity within its local community there will be further separating of the
larger communities; and simultaneously, evidence of growing strength and popu-
larity among the terrorist faction will naturally provoke a negative reaction from
the generally much larger moderate sectors of society whose position and support
are key for successful conflict resolution.
If, therefore, in cases of conflict resolution when an active terrorist group exists,
the two processes must be conducted simultaneously and yet somehow not succumb
to their inherent differences, how best is this to be done? This article explores this
problem by looking at the case of Turkey, and specifically at recent government
efforts to address the ‘‘Kurdish question.’’ It first shows how the chances for success
of the Turkish government’s early initiatives for conflict resolution, a process
referred to as the ac¸ılım or ‘‘opening up,’’ were reduced because this dilemma was
not carefully considered and thus the terrorist PKK organization and its leader were
allowed to become active participants in the process. The article then sets out to pro-
vide a roadmap for how such a simultaneous process can best take place. It should
be noted that the aim of the roadmap suggested in this article and the understanding
behind its supporting assumptions is that a realistic solution is needed: one that
moves beyond wishful thinking and tries to minimize the risk of an outcome that
would hurt all parties involved. It also must be acknowledged up front that it would
be destructively reductionist to view the process as taking place between ‘‘Turks’’
and ‘‘Kurds,’’ as though the two were homogenous groups. Divisions in Turkey’s
Turkish population are well documented, with many recent discussions focusing
on a widening gap between secularists and Islamists. With respect to Turkish Kurds,
a history of exposure to democratization, free economy, secularism, and nation-state
policies, attached to a belatedly developed nationalism in an internationally pene-
trated region, has contributed greatly to a fragmented societal structure not only
between them and the wider regional Kurdish population, but among Turkey’s
Kurdish community itself. The proposed roadmap attempts, therefore, to suggest
a route for marginalizing more radical factions without alienating the broader
Kurdish community from the conflict resolution process.
The Kurdish Case
The fate of the widespread Kurdish population in the Middle East remains one of
today’s major unresolved ethnic issues. Initiatives launched in Turkey in 2009 may
not only have effects on the future of Turkey’s Kurdish population but may also
offer a model for future patterns of ethnic-based conflict resolution in the extended
Middle East. If Turkey can cope with its Kurdish question successfully, it may
become an exemplar of successful peaceful conflict resolution for dealing with
440 E. Aydinli and N. A. Ozcan
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:0
4 2
5 O
cto
be
r 2
01
1 
minority issues, insurgencies, and even terrorism. Of course the reverse also holds
true. If Turkey fails in this effort and the result is a breakdown of the current conflict
resolution process, it will still present an example, but this time a negative one. Any
such failure will send a message to the rest of the Middle East about the fatal risks
of an accommodative, liberal conflict resolution approach based on democratic
principles.8
The majority of Turkish citizens and institutions have in past decades considered
the ‘‘Kurdish Question’’ as only a terrorism issue, in which the ‘‘answer’’ to the
‘‘question’’ was to be found in the successful elimination of the separatist terrorist
organization, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).9 In doing so, Turkish governance,
both the security establishment and political rulers, revealed a failure to distinguish
between countering terrorists and countering terrorism. In the face of terrorist
activity, there is of course a need for a quick response to those acts, including
capturing the individuals behind them in order to remove the immediate threat
and to comfort the society. But the larger issue does not end there. To fully counter
a terrorism threat requires understanding the root causes of the social mobilization
that produced the offending terrorists—a process more closely aligned with conflict
resolution. Without addressing the deeper issues, the need to cope with the terrorists
will never end.
With respect to the Kurdish Question, Turkey’s leaders have generally not
wanted to face the root causes of terrorist activity because it would mean directly
acknowledging the existence of a very big minority population, and coming to terms
with the possibility that the unifying policies that were part of the Republic’s found-
ing ideology—policies of a single nation, single language, and centralized power—
were perhaps neither well-founded nor realistic. To be fair, this avoidance was not
solely the result of short-sightedness or refusal; historical experience has also not
been helpful in promoting self-reflection or open appraisal. Turkey received a lion’s
share of the major global terror waves of the 20th century, in particular that of the
Cold War-provoked, left-wing wave of the 1960s and 1970s. That learning experi-
ence contributed to the general view of terrorists as agents of foreign influence,
thereby slowing down any move towards introspection and towards focusing on
the underlying causes of terrorism, even when the nature of that terrorist activity
changed. The countering terrorists framework that may have seemed appropriate
for ‘‘foreign-based’’ terror was at least familiar; the culture of security that it
stemmed from, its predominant institutions, and the techniques to be used within
it, were in place and ready to be applied in the face of new waves of terror. In a curi-
ous way, the discourse of ‘‘anti-terrorism’’ also served to numb public opinion and
thus alleviate successive governments from having to devise overarching policies to
deal with the broader Kurdish question. Ultimately though, the repeated failure
to move beyond an ‘‘anti-terrorist’’ paradigm generally served to produce more
violence, and to make a transition to conflict resolution even more difficult.
With the ‘‘opening up’’ (ac¸ılım) debate launched in mid-2009 by the Turkish
government leadership, we finally see evidence of a desire to shift from an anti-
terrorist approach towards a deeper addressing of the root causes of the problem:
accepting that the ‘‘Kurdish Question’’ goes beyond the PKK, and therefore neces-
sitates a political conflict resolution process that prioritizes non-military instruments
and takes into consideration ethnically motivated issues and demands. With a shift
to a conflict resolution mindset and an ethnicity-based political framework, however,
Turkey is entering uncharted waters. These waters are not only unfamiliar, but
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anxiety provoking, since the framework’s basic premises and the questions it raises
revive societal and institutional fears of the historical destruction of the Ottoman
Empire via ethnic revolts and separation efforts.
Anxiety is exactly what arose in the months since the launching of the ‘‘opening
up,’’ but the fact is that despite a lengthy period of inaction, there is no turning back.
First, the old framework was an anachronistic avoidance of a reality that can no
longer be ignored; second, the genie is out of the bottle. Now that questions are
being raised in every sector, from the political, to the judicial, to popular society,10
about what needs to be or should be done with respect to Turkey’s Kurdish popu-
lation, it is no longer possible to return to the days when the only question asked
was ‘‘how can we defeat the PKK?’’ Turkey stands therefore on the brink of an
unavoidable process of conflict resolution; the only real question is, what direction
will this process take?
It appears that conflict resolution between Turkey and some portions of its
Kurdish population can take one of two main routes. The first lies in the assumption
that continued political liberalization can allow for a formulation of co-existence
between Turks and Kurds within a fully democratic nation of Turkey. The second
is a more confrontational route aimed at some kind of formal separation of Turks
and Kurds. This second outcome would be highly complicated given the extreme
intermixing of the two societies both physically (large numbers of Kurds live outside
of Turkey’s most heavily Kurdish populated areas) and socially (the two groups have
lived among each other and intermarried over the centuries). It also runs a distinct
risk of bringing about a radicalization of Turkish politics, rising efforts to crush
Kurdish separatist activism, and a resulting protracted, violent, ethnic conflict, all
of which would inevitably lead to a weakening of the democratic standards achieved
to date.
Only the first option seems both desirable and feasible, but one factor seems to
present a problem for its successful achievement. When one draws on the experiences
of other attempts around the world to resolve ethnic conflicts that have been
accompanied by low-intensity conflict and terrorism, it seems clear that Turkey
would have been in a much better position to start this conflict resolution period
had the armed and violent Kurdish group, the PKK, first been marginalized.11 With
the PKK and its leader remaining as key players in the conflict resolution period, the
probability of protracted conflict and violence is increased. Unfortunately, the
opportunity to preemptively marginalize the PKK was missed, so now a counterter-
rorist process of marginalizing the PKK and a process of conflict resolution must
take place concurrently.
A Botched Opening
In July 2009, the Turkish government announced its determination to initiate an
ac¸ılım (opening up) with respect to the country’s many decades-long Kurdish
Question.12 In doing so it launched an important and arguably much overdue
attempt to address the issue of the country’s Kurdish population in an entirely
new manner. What is also evident, however, is that the initial moves for this
discussion were flawed. The first flaw was timing.13 Such a claim is not an attempt
to rationalize a further postponing of this discussion; in fact it could easily be argued
that it should have been launched even earlier. However this particular timing was
problematic in various ways. In economic terms the timing could not have been
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worse. In the middle of an economic crisis period,14 the government lacks the
resources that could help comfort both sides in this tricky process. There is insuf-
ficient money, for example, to comfortably fund developmental projects in the coun-
try’s poorer Southeast and gain the support of that region’s large Kurdish
population. On the other hand, if extra monies were to be set aside for that region,15
it could risk negative reactions among the Turkish population in other parts of the
country, which are also undergoing tight times.
While it might be argued that there could never be a perfect moment with respect
to economic matters, the timing of the initiative was also flawed in its apparent sud-
denness. The initial announcement in July seemed abrupt and ill-prepared, and was
immediately followed by sharp criticism from the opposition parties in Parliament.16
An apparent lack of pre-synchronization and pre-negotiation among the parties
increased the harshness of the responses, and ratcheted up the accusatory rhetoric,
including assertions that the government, in making such a ‘‘rash’’ move, must have
had either an ulterior motive (e.g., seeking popularity and ultimately votes among
the large Kurdish population) or was being externally pressured (e.g., that this
was an American plot).17
Even more important than questions of timing, there was the major structural
flaw of an apparent lack of an overall framework prescribing how the discussion
should ensue.18 In other words, the government failed to put forth a clear outline
of what the boundaries of the ‘‘opening up’’ discussion should be, how the discussion
should be conducted within those boundaries, and, perhaps most crucially, who
should be the primary participants in the discussion.19 In terms of participants, it
seems self-evident that a major conflict resolution negotiation period after years of
bloody struggle will unfold more smoothly if dominated by the less radical represen-
tatives on both sides. And in fact, the Turkish government has been making steps to
reduce radical elements on the Turkish side. For example, through the legal investi-
gation known as Ergenekon, extreme figures among the civilians as well as the mili-
tary (what could be considered the ‘‘hawks’’ with respect to the Kurdish question)
are being tried and imprisoned, and thus their ideas are being limited. Moreover,
the Turkish military has shown a willingness to accommodate democratic advances
and to adapt into a more Western understanding of civil-military relations. This
has included voicing the need for non-military solutions, arguing, for example,
that the heavily Kurdish-populated southeast region was ‘‘secured enough’’ to
allow non-military engagement—e.g., social, economic, psychological, and political
tools—with the Kurdish Question.20 More radical voices among the Turkish
public also seem to be diminished, as a growing number of the public media
have shown support for the process,21 and public surveys have shown increasing
approval for a discourse of ‘‘opening up’’22 (despite the equally notable increasing
anxiety).
Unfortunately, the lack of proper preparation before launching the discussion
meant that no efforts were taken to marginalize the radical elements on the Kurdish
side. Instead, their voices have remained in the forefront, and the discussion has been
dominated by the PKK and its rhetoric.23 Even the Kurdish political party, the
Democratic Society Party (DTP), is felt by many to be acting as the mouthpiece
for the PKK.24 This heightened visibility of the PKK has run the risk of giving them
extra legitimacy in the eyes of some Kurds who, heretofore, may have been hesitant
to support the organization, and has also given the impression that they are
necessarily a part of the process. Not only is it not the case that they have to be part
Conflict Resolution and Counterterrorism: Turkey’s Kurdish Question 443
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of the discussion, but their participation is in fact anathema to the process’ successful
conduct and conclusion.
No Room for This PKK
In Principle . . .
Several arguments can be made for why the PKK and its jailed leader
Abdullah Ocalan should not be a part of the conflict resolution process. First, at
the ideological level, the PKK’s clearly stated desire continues to be a legally estab-
lished state with two nations.25 Such an outcome would necessitate not only a new
political framework, but a new understanding of what ‘‘Turkey’’ is—a formulation
not compatible with the first route of coexistence within a democratic Turkish
nation.
The PKK also carries with it tremendous baggage. With its 30 years of confron-
tational history, its involvement in the volatile geopolitics of Iran and Northern Iraq,
and the resulting image it has among the Turkish population, the PKK’s partici-
pation risks further polarization of both the Turkish and Kurdish sides—possibly
even more so among the Kurds.26 The group’s presence therefore increases the risks
of both sides falling back on old practices: in other words, reverting to terrorist=
counterterrorist tendencies. The PKK might, under certain circumstances, continue
to commit terrorist acts that could upset the discussion process. Likewise, the
Turkish side might be led back into exclusively counterterrorism practices and
perspectives, and the ethnicity-based paradigm of addressing the Kurdish Question
could be overshadowed.
Finally, the PKK’s presence in the discussion increases the chance of a rising
Turkish resistance to what may be construed as an imbalanced process of rehabili-
tation. As noted above, Turkey seems to have gained some control over its more
radical actors from the previous era, but the Kurdish side, with the PKK and Ocalan
at its head, does not show signs of similar changes. It is not reasonable to expect the
Turks to easily agree to a process in which they are going through a cleaning up, nor-
malization effort, distancing themselves from the trauma of a 30-year low-intensity
conflict, while the Kurds are seen as having not yet begun to do so. This is not to say
that such an effort may not be equally desired on the Kurdish side, but given the
PKK’s long history and prestige among some for the role it has played in bringing
Kurdish issues to the table, its continued presence makes it much more difficult for
alternative representatives to be strengthened or to develop.
It also seems impossible to envisage a ‘‘PLO-ification’’ of the PKK, in other
words, an attempt to encourage the PKK to develop and transform into an entity
that could be a part of a conflict resolution process. The primary reason why it seems
virtually impossible for the PKK to reform in a manner that would significantly
change the picture presented above, is that the group suffers from a generational
problem. Namely, those who started the PKK, with its particular strategies and
ideas, still control the movement. If one looks at successful cases of transition of for-
mer insurgent or terrorist movements into partners for conflict resolution, it becomes
apparent that such major transitions come about after the removal of the first
generation.27 There was a chance for such a transition in 1999 when Ocalan was
captured and jailed and the group appeared faced with genuine marginalization,
but that window of opportunity closed, and now the PKK is strong and Ocalan is
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back in charge—with a unique capacity to manipulate the political process from
inside his prison cell.28
And in Practice . . .
Indeed, in the early months of the ac¸ılım, it became evident that the PKK’s presence
would be a hindrance to progress. The events of one week in particular show how a
conflict resolution process with PKK involvement runs the risk of failure. In
mid-October 2009, it was reported that a group of PKK militants would come from
Iraq and surrender in Turkey as a sign of good will and support for the overall
process. In response, the understanding was that Turkish authorities would ensure
their safe entry and release in Turkey. This peaceful surrender and release was
intended to be a major step towards a gradual full disarmament of the PKK, and
in the days leading up to the arrival the Prime Minister made speeches stressing
the positive message that would be sent by this move. Although the political oppo-
sition in parliament was cautious, the mood was in fact generally hopeful.
On Monday, October 19, a group of 34 PKK militants arrived at the Turkish
border with Iraq. Tens of thousands of people were there to meet them, including
DTP officials and numerous members of the press. While officially the event went
smoothly—a special court was set up to question the incoming militants and ‘‘release’’
them on Turkish soil—details of how events unfolded proved highly problematic.
Perhaps most damaging, live nationwide broadcasts revealed images of PKK
militants arriving in their familiar battle fatigues, cheering and making victory signs,
and being saluted and praised by those greeting them. Both PKK and DTP members
speaking to the press referred to the arriving militants as ‘‘peace ambassadors,’’ and
attributed credit for the possibility of such an important event to Abdullah Ocalan
and his longtime efforts. Almost immediately, commentaries began to emerge that
the management of this ‘‘surrender’’ had been poor,29 and that it had turned instead
into a political show to proclaim victory by the PKK, an organization that has been
legally, politically, and socially considered a terrorist network. The decision of the
court to release the militants also garnered criticism that they constituted a deviation
from routine legal procedures.
On Tuesday, October 20, the Turkish National Security Council met for nearly
seven hours. Even though the resulting statement avoided significant mention of this
particular issue, insider reports revealed that the previous day’s show and the widely
broadcast image of the PKK as a victorious organization were discussed in the meet-
ing, and considered by many as unacceptable behavior. As the day wore on, media
commentaries became even more condemnatory of Monday’s ‘‘show,’’ and intima-
tions began to emerge of a major societal reaction on the Turkish side to the images
of a victorious PKK.
By Wednesday, October 21, statements were released by governmental leaders,
including the Prime Minister, saying that Monday’s display had not been helpful to
overall progress, that it was provoking a backlash, and that within this context the
government was considering putting a halt to planned future arrivals of other PKK
militants. The next day, in light of increasingly bitter public commentary, the Turkish
Prime Minister announced that if the radical elements on the Kurdish side refused to
act in a more accommodating manner, the entire process would go back to square
one. Reports also emerged that the government was sending a message to the
PKK, telling them to cancel a scheduled arrival of PKK members from Europe.
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By the end of the week, there was widespread indignation on the Turkish side
with how things had progressed. The political opposition was up in arms, accusing
the government of ‘‘treason,’’ of being ‘‘hand in hand with the PKK,’’ and of violat-
ing the Constitution by setting up puppet courts.30 Public opinion of the process was
also in a spiral, and the government was openly backpedaling on the whole issue. On
the other side, the DTP had become completely marginalized, appearing only as a
sidekick to the PKK, while the PKK had emerged even more concretely as the
primary political representative of the ethnically mobilized Kurdish population.
Overall, the hopes for a smooth solution to the conflict resolution process were
essentially dashed, and the emphasis had switched to damage control to keep the
process from folding completely.
This is a picture of one week of attempted conflict resolution. There can be little
question but that the negative outcome was due to the large, visible role played by
the PKK. Clearly, with the PKK on the frontlines, the conflict resolution process
is hampered because the organization does not wish to or cannot move away from
what it was. The more visible the PKK, the more contentious the reaction, and in
such an environment the Turkish government is less able to act courageously, and
chances for a successful conflict resolution are reduced. In the year and a half follow-
ing that critical week, the process has ground almost entirely to a standstill. As noted
earlier, however, there can be no turning back on the opening up. Whatever threats
the government might make about going back to ‘‘square one,’’ the fact is that the
process must go on, and it must do so with the added handicap of a revitalized PKK.
How then can the conflict resolution process best be resumed, and what role should
counterterrorism play in the process?
A Road Map
General Principles
In prescribing how best to proceed from here, two main points must be made at the
outset. First, there is the need to reiterate that a successful roadmap to deal with
the Kurdish question is vital for Turkey, but also has important implications for
the region and for the international community—the EU and USA in particular.
Turkey’s route to dealing with its Kurdish population will likely serve as an example
for other regional powers dealing with domestic ethnicity issues. If Turkey achieves a
successful outcome of peaceful integration under a democratic rubric, it will provide a
positive reference point for others to follow. If Turkey follows a route of separation,
then others may be more likely to do so as well. As noted earlier, our starting assump-
tion is that a separation route will, in this case, heighten the chance for conflict, and is
not therefore a good solution for anyone. If separation and conflict emerge in Turkey,
not only will democratic conflict resolution become associated with the potential for
provoking additional problems, but regional security overall will be further disrupted,
as Kurds and other minorities in neighboring countries draw on this example. The
following roadmap therefore is one that aims for a solution within a framework of
coexistence in a democratic Turkey.
With respect to the strategies prescribed here, the main underlying idea is that
they must be multisided and simultaneous. Any roadmap that suggests unidimen-
sional policies, or concentrates singularly on dealing with the different groups or
problems in a linear manner, stands little hope for success. Therefore, even though
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we argue that the PKK is a primary concern, this does not mean that the conflict
resolution process can succeed by only concentrating for now on the PKK dimen-
sion. It must simultaneously deal with this issue and all other dimensions as well.
The strategies must first, help to liberate the process as much as possible from
the confrontational tendencies of radicals and fringe elements of all kinds; and
second, attempt to satisfy as many non-radicals as possible. The latter include the
average Turk, as well as the majority of Kurds in Turkey, who must be kept as
much as possible a part of the democratic, secular, liberal, Western-oriented,
country. What, therefore, can and should be offered within democratic norms and
practices to keep the middle ground satisfied while at the same time minimizing
the extremes?
Identifying Target Groups
In a combined counterterrorism=conflict resolution process, a starting point is to get
a general idea about what is meant by the middle ground and extremes. In this case,
with respect to Turkey’s Kurds, three general groupings can be identified—albeit
with some inevitable overlap: 1) Integrated Kurds; 2) Islamist Kurds; and 3) Active
Ethnic=Separatist Kurds. While the first clearly represent the moderate group
(generally satisfied with the status quo) and the last can be considered politically
revisionist (to varying degrees, from wanting to secure autonomous group rights,
to seeking regional autonomy, to wanting a separate state), the middle group has
elements of both.
So-called ‘‘Integrated Kurds’’ can be found represented in virtually all Turkish
political parties and, recently, have been participating with greater acknowledgement
of their Kurdish identity, and thus their sensitivity to Kurdish affairs. They are said
to represent around half of Turkey’s Kurdish population.31 Across the board, they
reject violence as a means for Kurds to achieve political goals in Turkey. Their over-
all demands with respect to Kurdish issues are to increase individual rights, and to
level democratic and economic standards in Turkey; within such a picture, the rights
of traditionally underrepresented groups will be more surely guaranteed.
Islamist Kurds may represent up to one-fifth of the Kurdish population.32 The
majority of Islamist Kurds have been a part of the country’s pro-Islamist political
parties, and have typically supported the AK party in the last two elections. There
is a tendency towards some violence among fringe elements of Kurdish Islamists,
with some ideological influence coming from Iran. At points in the past, some
radical members of related groups have gotten into violent struggles against both
the PKK and later against the Turkish government.33
Finally, the third group is that of active, ethnically mobilized=separatist Kurds,
who can be considered as possible supporters of the PKK and its agenda. Since the
DTP party is widely believed to be politically dominated by—some argue under the
control of—the PKK, many DTP supporters can also be grouped in this category.
To get a sense of the amount of support this group has, therefore, we can consider
the results of the last national election. TheDTP received 5.6% (2.6 million) of the total
votes.34 This represents roughly 40% of the overall Kurdish population.35 Even though
there have been slight variations in the political demands of active ethnic-separatist
Kurds over the years, in the final analysis, we can say that they seek some type of auto-
nomy, whether a strong, distinct ethnic autonomy within Turkey, a regional autonomy
within a federated Turkey, or a fully independent Kurdish state.
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Rescuing the Conflict-Resolution Process From Radicalization: A
Multidimensional Approach
Given such an understanding of the primary identities of Kurds within Turkey, what
can be done to isolate the fringe elements, without alienating their moderate counter-
parts? Looking first to the so-called ‘‘integrated’’ Kurds, policies must be in place to
keep them invested in the idea of belonging to a democratic, unified nation. Despite a
general sense of pessimism that often seems to cloud discussions about Turkey’s
Kurdish problem, there are positive notes. Turkey’s journey of integrating with the
West, specifically its accession process to the EU, as well as opportunities that have
arisen as part of liberal economic consolidation, have put in place a framework in
which integrated Kurds should continue to be satisfied. Rising democracy standards
with an even greater sensitivity to individual rights will presumably strengthen their
existing stance against violent approaches or separatist arguments, and will also pro-
mote their increasing participation in political parties and civil society organizations.
In other words, continued integration of this group can be encouraged by conceptua-
lizing today’s problems as ‘‘Turkey’s problems,’’ and by seeking solutions accord-
ingly. ‘‘Turkey’s problems’’ are those that can be best solved by deeper
democratization and greater economic growth—outcomes that benefit everyone
within Turkey’s borders. Such an approach is not only best suited to assure the con-
tinued integration of this first group of Kurds and to minimize the chances that they
will turn against a peaceful solution, it also helps ease the psychological struggle of
those Kurds who want recognition without separation—a delicate balance not easily
addressed. At the practical level, therefore, Turkey’s campaign for democratic open-
ing up must move forward on all levels, overall economic growth in the country must
be supported, and existing economic policies with respect to the Kurdish regions of
the country should continue, from subsidized loans for construction and economic
development to infrastructural investments in health services, roads, education, and
so on.36
For the Islamist Kurds, again, the current picture is cautiously positive, because
pro-Islamist politics have been in power for several years, and Islamist Kurds have a
clear role within that picture. The ruling AK party government now has around 50–75
Kurdish parliamentarians,37 and a maintaining of the government’s pro-Islamist dis-
course and policies should be enough to keep their constituents satisfied and averse to
separatist, conflictive routes. On the other hand, though the radical elements within
the Islamist Kurds may not be significant in number, they are dangerous and present
a clear risk to a smooth conflict resolution process. Fortunately, because their num-
bers are small, it is feasible to try and reduce them to an ineffectual fringe; therefore
the criminal countering measures that have been put in place against radical Kurdish
Islamists in violent organizations like Kurdish Hizbullah need to continue.38 One
cautionary note to Turkish authorities is that they be careful not to simply dismiss
the radical Kurdish Islamists as being the lesser of two evils in comparison with the
PKK. The radical Islamist Kurdish groups are much more closely linked to the
radical Islamist circles in Iraq and the larger Jihadist networks than are any other
groups in Turkey, and must therefore be kept under tight control.
Finally, with respect to those Kurds who can be identified as active ethnic-
separatists, there are two dimensions to the roadmap: what do you do with the
PKK as a terrorist organization,39 and how do you promote an alternative represen-
tative for non-Islamist Kurds that is independent from the PKK?
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Addressing the second point first, within the general politics of the country there
has to be a movement of capacity building for legal and legitimate, PKK-free (to the
extent possible) representation of Kurds. This effort should target the political core,
and therefore be aimed at the DTP. There is no denying that assuming this position
will be difficult for the DTP, and any realistic plan must be aware of how great the
challenge is. The biggest problems for the DTP or other Kurdish political parties seem
to stem from their strong ties with the PKK itself. The founding rationale and energy
that helped shape the basic culture of the Kurdish political parties is essentially the
same as that of the PKK, namely, a separatist ideology with Marxist-Leninist,
revolutionary left-wing origins. Within this philosophy, armed activity and an auth-
oritarian ideology are the norm, and the role given to legal, political extensions is
minimal. In the case of the PKK, for example, the political wing is in charge of
civilian, political propaganda. The impression therefore—if not practice—is of polit-
ical parties that are not independent actors, but institutions basically serving as
propaganda wings in counterpart to the military side of a shared movement.
Other factors also contribute to the argument that the PKK holds considerable
behind-the-scenes control over the legal Kurdish political parties. The PKK’s first
generation leaders remain alive and active; therefore their seniority, prestige, and
power naturally shape the political atmosphere within legal Kurdish politics.
Cultural issues play a role as well. Patriarchal cultural structures within Kurdish
society facilitate single-power cults, therefore favoring the PKK’s hierarchical man-
agement style over such practices as consensus building and competition of ideas. In
light of such pressures, legal political parties seem unable to nominate candidates
that are clearly disassociated from the PKK, but rather, seem forced to agree to
nominations supported by the PKK’s leadership.40
A process of capacity building for the DTP must therefore begin with an official
setting aside of feelings that the DTP is indistinguishable from the PKK. The entire
political system in Turkey, from political parties, to bureaucrats and other state
authorities, must try to embrace the DTP and its leaders. In the parliament or at other
political gatherings, DTP leaders should be properly acknowledged and treated as
important partners in the political process. Their stature and self-confidence must
be boosted, since isolating or ostracizing them only pushes them further towards the
PKK. Embracing theDTP places the onus on them tomore carefully consider and bal-
ance their affinities to the PKK with their full participation in the government. Of
course the fear is real that such a legitimizing of the DTP ultimately spells a legitimiz-
ing of the PKK, but this risk can be afforded if it is done as part of a multi-dimensional
approach. In this case, for example, a boosting of the DTP that coincides with pressure
and effective policies against the PKK is a risk that can be taken.
At the practical level, to help improve the DTP’s democratic and legal account-
ability among Kurds, there must also be a promotion of the party’s connection to
issues of social welfare and services, rather than to just those of ethnicity and politics.
In other words, the government needs to promote and support DTP representatives
(currently in charge of nearly 96 municipalities)41 to speak about building roads,
clean water projects, improved sewage systems, or other municipal services, rather
than focusing only on Kurdish rights. If necessary, DTP-represented municipalities
should receive additional aid—provided it is guaranteed that this aid is spent for
infrastructural development and social or municipal services.
It is true that if any conflict resolution plan is to possibly succeed, the imbal-
anced relationship between the PKK and the legal Kurdish political parties needs
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to be fully taken into consideration when deciding to boost the DTP’s role as polit-
ical interlocutor. Promoting the DTP must therefore be done simultaneously with a
pushing back on the PKK. How, then, can the PKK be effectively marginalized?
Dealing With the PKK
The policies recommended above, if performed in a cohesive and integrated manner,
will contribute to maintaining the support of the already integrated Kurds and the
peaceful Islamist Kurds, and will help to isolate the radical Islamists and the armed
PKK. But these efforts alone will not be enough to fully marginalize the PKK and
eliminate the risk that it could interfere with and disrupt the conflict resolution pro-
cess; additional concrete steps must be taken to reduce the armed potential. The focus
of these concrete steps must be that they serve to minimize the PKK’s violent armed
power, without upsetting or alienating moderate Kurds within or outside of Turkey.
Key to this effort is the removal of the PKK’s safe haven in Northern Iraq. As
long as the armed PKK maintains a safe haven this close strategically to Turkish
territory, it will inevitably continue to securitize and radicalize the entire process,
thus keeping its success in constant jeopardy. The presence of armed PKK forces
safely ensconced across the border essentially guarantees a continuation of logistical
support, effective propaganda, and violence that will keep Turkish authorities
embedded in a counterterrorism understanding, and will overshadow any emerging,
evolving, PKK-free practices by the DTP. To wax poetic, under the shadow of arms,
no political roses can emerge.
Many may argue that it is not possible to eliminate the PKK presence in
Northern Iraq, the argument being that during the 1990s Turkey repeatedly sent
thousands of troops into Iraq and even maintained a continuous military presence
there until 2003, and was still unable to achieve this goal. Granted, such efforts alone
are insufficient to cope with the overall issue, but this does not mean that military
measures should not at least be kept on the table, as they too can have a role to play.
It would be inaccurate, for example, to say that previous Turkish military operations
were complete failures. In 1992, following operations by cooperating Turkish and
Northern Iraqi (Talabani) forces, the PKK was forced to withdraw to the Zele region
near the Iranian border. This move dramatically disrupted the PKK organization and
forced it to declare a cease-fire. In 1995, Turkey’s second major military operation led
the PKK to declare a change in strategy, away from a protracted people’s war, and
then in 1997, a third major operation launched the process that ended with the
removal of PKK leader Ocalan from his refuge in Syria. Despite these relative
successes, the military’s inability to control the entire terrain on a permanent basis,
together with fluctuating political developments, have enabled the PKK’s resilience.
Clearly, therefore, the military approach is a limited one, something not to be
dismissed entirely, but something that will be meaningful only when used as part of
a larger strategy.
The most realistic goal of such military operations, therefore, is not to aim for
total elimination of the PKK, but rather to significantly damage the PKK’s logistics
and training potential in Northern Iraq, which can in turn help produce greater
political confidence for both accommodative Turkish politics and for PKK-free
Kurdish politics. Ultimately, for a successful conflict resolution process to take place
in Turkey, the PKK should be prevented from feeling safe and comfortable when in
Northern Iraq. A destabilized PKK will be less able to sabotage a peace process.
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There are a number of other reasons why the PKK’s safe haven in Northern Iraq
is extremely harmful for the resolution process, beginning with the role it plays in
helping the PKK maintain its arms and then use that strength for various kinds of
leverage. Maintaining arms and strength just across the border helps them have
social, political, and economic control over the broader Kurdish population in
Turkey. It enables them to threaten and even punish those Kurds who disagree with
or act in opposition to their violent separatist efforts.42 They also use those arms to
guarantee their institutional continuity,43 in other words, the occasional violent acts
they commit are a visible reminder that the group is still intact and in power, and
thus serve to help boost internal recruitment. Such acts can even be used for bargain-
ing purposes and leverage against the government. Armed attacks, from hit and run
acts, planting roadside bombs, or targeting pipelines and touristic centers, make the
governing AK party appear incompetent in their new efforts to deal with the PKK
and with the broader Kurdish Question. A sense of government failure combined
with the aftereffect of the attacks themselves, breeds increased Turkish nationalism,
strains civil-military relations, lowers Kurdish support for the government, and risks
a loss of votes from moderate Turks who just want stability. Continued attacks
therefore make sense for the armed faction, since an AK party government feeling
such pressure might be expected to conduct more accommodating policies to the
ethnic separatist Kurds in order to bring an end to the attacks.
In light of these arguments, it is clear that the PKK’s armed forces’ threatening
potential must be minimized. To accomplish this, there must be a two-pronged
approach of awards and threats. The award must be based on guarantees that
militants who give up their arms can go back to their countries (primarily, but not
exclusively, Turkey), and that their legal, safe return will be supported by economic
and political incentives. In Turkey, for example, support and rehabilitation centers
must be established and, crucially, a system must be in place to help returned com-
batants find employment. The level of trust necessary for such a policy to work is
admittedly tremendous. A framework of guarantees would therefore have to be
certified state policy, ultimately based on consensus among political parties, the
military, the government, the presidency, and intellectuals=the media. To achieve
this, however, there must first be an internal consensus on the details of the
economic, legal, and political arrangements within the Turkish state establishment.
Negotiations must be conducted outside of public view, for as similar previous res-
olution processes have shown, an excessive multiplicity of voices should be avoided.
Moreover, once an agreement is achieved, it should be conveyed discreetly and
through closed channels to the representatives of the armed groups in Turkey and
outside.
In order to guarantee that the conflict process proceeds and that as many
PKK elements as possible agree to it, there must also be a threat. The first dimen-
sion of the threat must include a convincing imposition of an internationally
accepted image that all legal and political barriers have been lifted from Turkey
to deal with the PKK’s safe havens beyond Turkey’s borders. The second dimen-
sion of the threat must be that those militants who refuse the above offer will be
the target of counterterrorist operations. Such operations would by nature be pain-
ful, but would be necessary to marginalize these radicals and protect the conflict
resolution process. Any such operations would have to be conducted in a manner
designed to minimize civilian casualties, and in line with all international and
national legal standards.
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Ultimately, at the national level, one of the greatest challenges to success in this
effort may be the government’s lack of experience or inability in galvanizing state and
politics behind a cohesive, national strategic plan. One contributing factor to this
ineffectiveness may be that since Turkish democracy and democratic politics remain
still quite young, and have yet to develop a mature tradition of crafting bipartisan-
ship, the role of the opposition is generally understood as simply opposing everything
the government proposes. On the other hand, governing is still seen to some degree as
practicing power without necessarily trying to build up pacts and seek consensus.
Such understandings seriously handicap the potential solutions for national problems
such as the Kurdish question, and others. Various other problems, from the
over-compartmentalization of Turkish governance—even within the security
establishment—and the historical faultlines and lack of trust between the security
establishment and the political realm44 (not to mention within the political realm
itself), present additional stumbling blocks to the managing of a multi-level roadmap.
Nevertheless, if ever there was a time that Turkey could manage this, it is now.
Domestically, the marginal extremists on the Turkish side are at their lowest level
of visibility ever, and internationally, expectations are high for Turkey to assume a
role of regional stabilizer rather than disturbance. One question remains: what should
the role of the international community itself be in this process?
The Role of the International Community
The roadmap above has emphasized certain principal features necessary for a
successful conduct of the conflict resolution process being launched in Turkey,
and has identified particular measures and approaches that must be carried out to
ensure the benefit of different parties in the process. There is also an underlying
reality that for many of the recommended steps in the roadmap, the international
community, and the United States in particular, has a crucial role to play. The first
step of this concerns the safe haven in Northern Iraq. As argued above, minimizing
the PKK’s armed potential cannot be done without dismantling their Northern Iraq
safe haven, and this cannot be done without American engagement and cooperation.
American policies which indirectly serve to protect a safe haven in northern Iraq for
a group that threatens not only an American ally but also the greater stability in a
critical region is against American interests.
Helping Turkey deal with the PKK’s presence in Northern Iraq is not only
important for dealing with the direct problem of reducing the organization’s armed
forces, it has an important role in providing moral support for Turkey in what is a
challenging process overall. American engagement with the PKK issue has the power
to give a major psychological boost to a Turkish government and political system
that may be feeling hesitant and cautious about the impending process, and can help
increase its will to move ahead—even with those dimensions of the roadmap that are
not directly aimed at the PKK. Helpful moves by the Americans and the rest of the
international community can strengthen the Turkish government’s resolve, and
undercut accusations by opposing Turkish voices that the international community
serves only to block Turkey’s efforts vis-a`-vis the PKK. Such efforts would thus
indirectly benefit the United States, by helping reestablish a more positive image
of America in Turkey.
Helping the Turkish government in this effort seems to carry few risks for the
United States. Some might warn that they will upset the Kurdish population in
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Northern Iraq, but the only element there that is truly likely to be offended and
angered is that of the armed PKK itself. As long as such efforts against the armed
PKK forces in Northern Iraq are conducted within a multi-dimensional roadmap,
both within a framework that supports democratic and economic development
and in coordination with efforts like support for the DTP and amnesty for those
PKK who disarm, it is unlikely that average Kurds in either Turkey or Northern
Iraq will take offense. The key to success remains a simultaneous isolating of the
radical marginals, with a continuing support of the moderate majority.
It is true that the U.S. is in many ways already cooperating with Turkey,
particularly in terms of sharing intelligence, which is utilized to support Turkish air
raids. But the limitations of this cooperation are paralleled in the limitations of
the resulting air raids. As is clear from the American experience in Iraq and
Afghanistan, air operations are not completely effective against guerilla groups and
insurgents, which, like the PKK, operate in small numbers and take advantage of
the rough terrain. Combating such groups requires land capabilities and surgical attack
operation potential, which means controlling the land and keeping the insurgent group
continuously on the run. Accomplishing this with the PKK can only be realized by a
willing Iraqi government and northern Iraqi authorities, for which American influence
is key. The current U.S. attitude towards the Kurdish question in the region appears to
be a rather passive one of ‘‘wait and see.’’45 Such a position will need to become more
proactive if it is to serve both Turkey’s and America’s interests.
Conclusion
Conflict resolution processes are never easy, and they become more complicated
when one of the participating parties contains an armed and active terrorist faction.
Experiences from the Turkish case point to certain suggestions for successful conflict
resolution in contexts with existing terrorism problems. First among these is that
engaging in conflict resolution efforts alone is not an adequate approach to solving
a terrorism problem. It is similarly not feasible to move abruptly from a counterter-
rorism paradigm to one of conflict resolution—abruptly dismissing the institutions,
rules, and policies of the counterterrorism establishment and moving into an exclus-
ively political, negotiation-based approach. Rather, one needs a simultaneous man-
agement of conflict resolution and counterterrorism, but with certain conditions.
The Turkish case suggests that throughout such conflict resolution processes, the
government must maintain both the discursive and physical upper-hand against the
terrorist faction. Public opinion on all sides must continue to believe that the govern-
ment remains strong, and that traditional counterterrorism policies can and may
continue if necessary. The potential to defeat the terrorists militarily should be real,
and to manage this, the counterterrorism establishment should emotionally and
physically maintain a determined capacity to strike back if necessary. This show
of strength potential is necessary to keep the terrorist faction from being able to
use their own armed potential as leverage during the political negotiations. For
successful conflict resolution, the terrorists must be kept in check, and only by
having a working counterterrorism strategy in place and poised to activate can this
be accomplished.
Having said this, however, there must equally be a very clear understanding that
such counterterrorism readiness is very much a part of a larger conflict resolution
process. Ultimately, while neither process can stand alone, conflict resolution can
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also not serve to counter terrorist activities. On the contrary, effective resolution of
such conflicts seems to demand a multifaceted policy in which counterterrorism
serves to further conflict resolution.
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kurt.acilimi.abdnin.plani.mi/15068/index.html. For a rejection of such claims by the
American Embassy in Ankara, see: http://www.haber7.com/haber/20090824/Kurt-Acilimi-
ABD-projesi-iddiasina-yanit.php
18. The apparent lack of a framework is implied in the ever-changing reference points for
the initiative, from early references to a ‘‘Kurdish opening up,’’ http://www.milliyet.com.tr/
Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&KategoriID=4&ArticleID=1120538&Date=
23.07.2009&b=Erdogan:%20Kurt%20acilimi%20icin%20calisma%20baslattik&ver=15, to
calling it a ‘‘democratic opening up,’’ http://www.ntv.com.tr/id/24991846/, and finally,
referring to the initiative as a ‘‘National Unity Project,’’http://samanyolu.com/haber/
52945/basbakan-mill%C3%AE-birlik-projesinin-ilk-adimini-attik/
19. In the absence of a clear plan for the boundaries of the discussion, early debate turned
controversial on questions of constitutional reform, leading the government to react with
counter-claims that they would not touch the constitution. See both:http://www.haber7.
com/haber/20091008/Cicek-Ortak-degerler-ilk-3-madde.php, and http://www.milliyet.com.
tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1134188&b=Anayasa%20
degisikligi%20gundemimizde%20yok
20. Chief of Staff I˙lker Bas¸bug˘, in his speech on 14 April 2009, presented a general outline
of the army’s approach towards terrorism, and emphasized non-military strategies. He also
refers to individual identity rights, and the need to acknowledge those rights. http://www.
tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2009/org_ilkerbasbug_
harpak_konusma_14042009.html
21. Although the Turkish media tend to be very much divided in their positions on the
government itself, on the ‘‘Opening Up’’ issue, there was no clear opposition. For example,
the more liberal media, generally considered critical of the government (the Dogan group),
by and large supported the process, presumably since it was, at heart, a liberal policy. Also
necessary to note are allegations that the media may be becoming more fearful of govern-
mental reprisals for negative reporting.
22. For four different surveys from the past two years see: 25.08.2009: http://www.
aksam.com.tr/2009/08/25/haber/guncel/6185/gerilim_duserse_destek_artacak_.html;
25.11.2009: http://www.aktifhaber.com/news_detail.php?id=257469; 11.01.2010: http://
www.aktifhaber.com/news_detail.php?id=266258; 14.02.2010: http://www.haber3.com/
acilima-destek,-ergenekona-veto-550779h.htm
23. An example of this domination can be seen in the words of the Chair of the
Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce, a former politician, who despite his earlier anti-PKK
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views, in the course of the Opening Up process came to express far more favorable views to the
PKK: ‘‘Nothing will work without the PKK’’ [PKK Yok Sayilirsa Olmaz] and ‘‘Ocalan Can-
not be Dismissed’’ [O¨calan Go¨zardı Edilmemeli]. Available at http://www.radikal.com.tr/
Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetay&ArticleID=946354&Date=23.07.2009&CategoryID=77
24. Sources include Leyla Zana’s statement in which she refers to Ocalan openly as the
‘‘leader’’ of the Kurdish movement [Our Leader was in Imrali in ’99] ‘‘Onderimiz 99’da
Imrali’daydi’’ (Hurriyet, 19.07.09, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6916207.asp?gid=
180 and a call from European leaders to the DTP to ‘‘distance itself from terrorism.’’
http://www.todayszaman.com/tzweb/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=117904
25. PKK circles were not only very much in opposition to the initiative, but also referred
back to their original goals when starting the struggle decades earlier, including the essential
ideas of an autonomous parliament, militia—a de facto separate Kurdish state. See articles
from the official PKK news portal: http://www.firatnews.nu/index.php?rupel=nuce&
nuceID=14514. ‘‘The acilim theater will come to an end’’: http://www.firatnews.nu/index.
php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=14953; ‘‘Karayılan: We’ll resist against these classic tactics’’:
http://www.firatnews.nu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=14327; http://www.firatnews.nu/
index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=12070; ‘‘Cemil Bayık: The Kurdish nation should get ready
for historical resistance’’: http://www.firatnews.nu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=15117
26. The PKK itself was born and developed by drawing on the conflictive primordial
potential among Kurdish tribes. For example, the organization was responsible for the deaths
of certain Chieftains in order to provoke inter-group enmity, and to promote recruitment. Nihat
Ali O¨zcan, PKK, Tarihi &idot;deolojisi ve Yo¨ntemi (Ankara: ASAM Publishing: 1999), 41, 122.
27. Gvineria (see note 11 above).
28. Via his lawyers, Ocalan’s ideas are regularly released either in pro-PKK news portals
or even in Turkish newspapers. His ideas and positions are allowed to be a part of the dis-
cussion and thus shift the debate in various directions. For example, lawyers, after meeting
with Ocalan, publish their meeting notes in PKK publications, see e.g., http://www.gundem-
online.net/haber.asp?id=35. Also see the public debates on whether Ocalan should be forbid-
den from talking with his lawyers due to fears that these meetings are actually being used for
dissemination of his ideas, e.g., http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/02/25/ocalanin.
avukatlariyla.gorusmesi.yasaklanabilir/565281.0/index.html. Ocalan has even been known
to scold the Kurdish political leaders, e.g., ‘‘I Keep Getting Scolded by Ocalan’’ [‘O¨calan’dan
habire fırc¸a yiyip duruyorum’], http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/24970655/
29. Former opposition Leader Baykal was quoted as saying, ‘‘The Law was Assaulted to
Protect the PKK,’’ http://www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/500797-pkkliyi-himaye-icin-
hukukun-irzina-gecildi and MHP Leader Bahceli said, ‘‘Erdogan, with [this policy] lit the fuse
for Turkey’s ethnic disintegration,’’ http://www.haber7.com/haber/20090519/Bahceliden-
Erdogana-ihanet-suclamasi.php
30. In addition to these accusations, other criticisms by various opposition party
members can be seen at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/12910729.asp
31. For a historical background to such categorizations see M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat
Ali O¨zcan, ‘‘The Kurdish Question and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party,’’ Middle
East Policy 13, no. 1 (2006): 102–119.
32. See for details and origins of the political Islamist movement among the Kurds in
Turkey ‘‘Kurdish Investigation’’ [Ku¨rd Sorus¸turması] (Ankara: Sor Publishing, 1992); Fulya
Atacan, ‘‘A Kurdish Islamist Group in Modern Turkey: Shifting Identities,’’ Middle Eastern
Studies 37, no. 3 (2001): 111–144; and Hizbullah Tero¨r O¨rgu¨tu¨ [The Hizbullah Terror Organi-
zation] (Ankara: TEMUH Publishing, 2001).
33. Iran’s influence on and involvement in the Kurdish Islamist movement was revealed in
documents confiscated during police operations against Hizbullah in 2000. This involvement
included the military and political training of the organization’s leaders in Iran. Also in these
documents was evidence of the Islamist Kurdish groups’ clashes with the PKK. See for report-
ing on this: ‘‘Iran’s Secret Service Trained Velioglu (Hizbullah’s leader)’’ [Veliog˘lu’nu I˙ran Gizli
Servisi eg˘itti] available at: http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-127621 and
‘‘DGM (State Security Court): Iran Trained and Supported Hizbullah’’ [DGM: Hizbullah’ı
I˙ran eg˘itti ve destekledi] http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-158015
34. Results can be seen on the webage of the Turkish High Election Council: http://
www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2009MahalliIdareler/ResmiGazete/IlGenel.pdf
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35. Servet Mutlu, ‘‘Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study,’’ International
Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 4 (1996): 517–541. Mutlu’s study makes projections
based on the most recent census that measured ethnic background. According to that census
in 1965, 9.98% of the population was of Kurdish origin. Mutlu calculated that in 1990 that
would have risen to 12.60%, and by 2000 to 13.82%. If we estimate the population in 2009
as being around 15%, out of the total votes cast of 41 million, the DTP’s 5.68% (presumably
all coming from Kurdish-origin voters) would equal roughly 40% of Kurdish voters.
36. See, for example, information on Turkey’s ‘‘Green Card’’ for free health care and the
distribution percentages of these free services in the country’s Kurdish regions, http://
arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/352745.asp
37. http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=238214
38. Criminalization of the movement cannot be dismissed, as it is not a secret that there is
debate among Islamist Kurds about whether to take advantage of the democratic system or to
move further underground and follow a more illegal route. For details of the debate see the
website of the Mustazafder Islamist organization: http://www.mustazafder.org/default.asp?
sayfa=detay&id=6&Yid=444. Also see debates about the possible starting of an Islamist
Kurdish Party—again reflecting the contradicting views: ‘‘Is an Islamist Kurdish Party Being
Established?’’ [I˙slamcı Ku¨rt Partisi mi kuruluyor?] http://www.8sutun.com/Islamci-Kurt-
Partisi-mi-kuruluyor_36287.html.
39. The PKK is categorized as a terrorist organization by both the United States and
Europe. For Europe see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:
2009:023:0037:004, for the U.S. see the Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organi-
zations, Available at: http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/terrorism/state/103392.pdf
40. As examples of how the PKK and its leaders influence the legal Kurdish political
parties, there is the case of the time when the DTP was closed by the Constitution Court
and parliamentary members of the party decided to resign from the Parliament in protest.
Shortly after, however, they changed their position, upon receiving clear orders from Ocalan
saying that they could remain. ‘‘Ocalan: DTP’liler Meclise geri donus yapabilirler’’ [Ocalan:
the DTP MPs can return to the Parliament], December 16, 2009, available at http://www.
gundem-online.net/haber.asp?haberid=83803. Similarly, when DTP parliamentarians
declared that they would boycott the referendum for constitutional amendments in 2010, they
again seemed forced to backtrack after Ocalan announced a different position. ‘‘Ocalan:
Demokratik Anayasa sarti ile paket desteklenebilir’’ [Ocalan: With the Condition of a Demo-
cratic Constitution the Government’s Proposals can be supported], April 21, 2010, available at
http://www.gundem-online.net/haber.asp?haberid=90197. Yet another example is that of
Ocalan asking for the opening of a ‘‘political academy,’’ and the DTP immediately launching
the initiative. ‘‘Apo: Akademi Kurulmali diyorum’’ [Apo: An Academy has to be started],
available at http://www.gundem-online.net/haber.asp?haberid=75032 and ‘‘DTP: Siyaset
Akademisini yarin aciyor’’ [DTP: The Political Academy will open tomorrow], available at
http://www.gundem-online.net/haber.asp?haberid=76791
41. See for the list of DTP municipalities: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2009-
MahalliIdareler/ResmiGazete/BelediyeBaskanligi.pdf
42. The PKK refers to those voices in the Kurdish community who are critical of the
PKK as ‘‘counter’’ forces—implying that they are spies for the Turkish forces. After labeling
them in this way, attempts are sometimes made to eliminate them. See for an example a press
release by a PKK regional command leader containing ‘‘counter’’ allegations: http://www.
firatnews.nu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=14344 and another piece warning of counter
elements: http://www.firatnews.nu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=11935
43. It is generally assumed that terrorist activity improves the sense of belonging and
loyalty among terrorist recruits. Conversely, the lack of conflict and activity may reduce the
organization’s power to control its members. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter,
‘‘The Strategies of Terrorism,’’ International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 49–79.
44. For a more detailed analysis of the Turkish inner state structure as based on the
military’s role in Turkish governance, see Ersel Aydinli, ‘‘Governments vs. States: Decoding
Dual Governance in the Developing World,’’ Third World Quarterly 31, no. 5 (2010): 693–707.
45. Henri J. Barkey comments on Washington’s seeming obliviousness to the seriousness
of the PKK problem in ‘‘Turkey’s Silent Crisis,’’ Foreign Policy 31 (August 2010), available at
www.foreignpolicy.com
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